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1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop a concept of structural econometric model through
a specific model building strategy and embed the concept of causality within
the framework of a suitably constructed structural model, justifying accord-
ingly that a structural model be also called a causal model. We show that
the structurality of a model depends both on its probabilistic structure and
on its parameterization. We also expose some difficulties, and pitfalls, in
the treatment of identification and of reparameterization, particularly when
treating observationally equivalent models through different parameteriza-
tions.
Following Mouchart, Wunsch and Russo (2015), we rely on a specific
approach to structural modeling that combines two main econometric tra-
ditions. On the one hand, one of these traditions starts from a “theory ”
(i.e. economic theory) and develops a structural model from the statistical
implications of an economic theory. This approach has been proposed by
the Cowles Commission (CC), in particular Koopmans and Havelmoo. On
the other hand, another tradition starts from the idea of a “Data Generating
Process ” (DGP), representing how the data have been generated: a struc-
tural model then looks for a structure underlying the DGP. This approach
has been launched by D. Sargan at LSE and further developed by D. Hendry
and others.
The order of exposition is as follows. In the next three sections, we pro-
pose a statistical approach to the concept of structural model by successively
examining econometric models as a class of statistical models and the recur-
sive decomposition of a model as a device for providing explanatory power
to a model. We also show that the parameterization of a decomposed model
is part of the explanatory process. The structurality of the model is related
to field knowledge, in particular under some form of economic theory, and to
properties of stability, or invariance, with respect to a class of interventions
or of changes of the environment. Section 5 presents two major difficulties
when treating the parameterization of a structural model. A first one deals
with illegitimate constraints when blending two parameterizations of a same
model; we show, in particular, that this error has been made repeatedly in
the econometric literature. Another difficulty deals with the structural in-
terpretation of the parameterizations of two different economic mechanisms
leading nevertheless to observationally equivalent models. The last section
takes an helicopter view of the achievements of this paper and points out, in
particular, some implications for the design of an economic policy based on
an econometric model.
3
2 Econometric Models as Statistical Models
In this paper, we approach an econometric model as a particular type of
statistical model.
Formally, a statistical model M may be viewed as a set of probability
distributions, explicitly:
M = {S, Pω ω ∈ Ω} (1)
where S, the sample space or observation space, is the range space of an
observable random variable (or vector of variables) and for each ω ∈ Ω, Pω is
a probability distribution on the sample space, i.e. the sampling distribution.
In other words, ω is a characteristic, or parameter, of the corresponding
distribution and Ω describes the set of all sampling distributions belonging
to the model. The basic idea is that the data are to be analyzed as if
they were a realization of one of those distributions. A statistical model
can accordingly be viewed as a set of plausible hypotheses regarding the
Data Generating Process (for short, DGP); for more detail see Mouchart
and Russo (2011), and Wunsch, Mouchart and Russo (2014).
A statistical model is based on a stochastic representation of the world.
The random component of the model delineates the frontier, or the internal
limitation, of the statistical explanation. More explicitly, the randomness
represents what is not explained by the model, while the parameters of the
distributions are the cornerstone of the statistical explanation.
A structural econometric model endeavors at unfolding the structure
of an underlying economic mechanism assumedly generating the observed
data. In the words of Illari and Williamson (2012): “A mechanism for a
phenomenon consists of entities and activities organized in such a way that
they are responsible for the phenomenon”. This definition is general enough
to be applicable to social contexts too. For economic phenomena, a mech-
anism may be viewed as a mathematical structure that models choices of
economic agents or institutions through which economic activity is guided
and coordinated. This mathematical structure provides a representation of
a mechanism either in a deterministic form when the model is assumed to
provide a complete explanation of a phenomenon or in a probabilistic form
when the explanation is considered as an incomplete one. An econometric
model, being a statistical one, belongs to the second alternative and takes
the form of a conditional distribution where the endogenous variable is the
one generated by the mechanism and the conditioning variables are those
under which the mechanism is operating.
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3 Recursive decomposition and sub-mechanisms
An econometric model is not always structural. Its aim may be to pro-
vide an insightful description of the observed data without the ambition of
unfolding the mechanisms and sub-mechanisms underlying the DGP. Thus,
many macro-econometric models as well as models of financial econometrics
are based on the literature concerning the empirical issue of interest and on
some stylized facts that the author aims to interpret. These models are of a
descriptive nature, as they do not aim at unfolding a structural mechanism
underlying a DGP.
3.1 Recursive decomposition
A structural econometric model is not only aimed at providing a stochastic
representation of a global mechanism, but should also provide an explanation
of that process. Once the model is dealing with a large number of variables,
the usual way of explaining a complex process is given by a decomposition of
the global mechanism into an ordered sequence of simpler sub-mechanisms.
This is the objective of a recursive decomposition of a statistical model.
More explicitly, let us consider a partition of the data X into p compo-
nents: X = (X1, X2, · · ·Xp). Suppose that the components of X have been
ordered in such a way that in the complete marginal-conditional decompo-
sition of the joint distribution of X:
pX(x | ω) = pXp|X1,X2,···Xp−1(xp | x1, x2, · · ·xp−1, θp|1,···p−1) ·
pXp−1|X1,X2,···Xp−2(xp−1 | x1, x2, · · ·xp−2, θp−1|1,···p−2) ·
· · · pXj |X1,X2,···Xj−1(xj | x1, x2, · · ·xj−1, θj|1,···j−1) ·
· · · pX1(x1 | θ1) (2)
each component of the right hand side is characterized by mutually indepen-
dent parameters, i.e. variation-free in a sampling theory framework:
ω = (θp|1,···p−1, θp−1|1,···p−2 · · · , θ1) ∈ Θp|1,···p−1 ×Θp−1|1,···p−2 · · · ×Θ1 (3)
or a priori independent in a Bayesian framework. When each factor in (2)
stands for a univariate conditional distribution, equations (2) and (3) char-
acterize a completely recursive system. When some, or all, factors represent
the conditional distribution of a vector of variables, equations (2) and (3)
characterize a partially recursive, or block-recursive, system.
The right-hand side of equation (2) may be interpreted as an ordered se-
quence of p sub-mechanisms, each one characterized by a distribution gener-
ating a variable conditionally on (an increasing set of ) conditioning variables.
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This is in line with Illari and Williamson (2012) and is compatible with an
interpretation of the recursive decomposition in terms of sub-mechanisms in
a structural model, as detailed in Wunsch, Mouchart, Russo (2014). Equa-
tion (3) requires that there are no restrictions binding the parameters of
different factors of (2), in particular that there are no common parameters,
and allows one to interpret each factors of the decomposition as independent
sub-mechanisms.
A reference to the Simultaneous Equations Model (SEM) may be useful.
In its standard formulation, the structural form of the SEM may be written
as follows.
By + Cz = u u ∼ N (0,Σ) u⊥ z (4)
The condition u⊥ z implies that the equation in (4) is derived from the
conditional distribution of (y | z) and the conditional expectation IE (y | z)
is given by the reduced form:
y = Π z + v where Π = −B−1C v = B−1u (5)
By + Cz = u (6)
y + (B − I)y + Cz = u (7)
y = (I −B)y − Cz + u (8)
This model is said recursive when the matrix B is lower triangular (along
with the usual normalization rule of making the elements of the main di-
agonal equal to 1) and Σ is diagonal. Under a normality assumption, this
recursive system of equations stands for an ordered sequence of conditional
expectations and the errors are mutually independent. In this case, the SEM
corresponds to a completely recursive decomposition of the joint distribution
of the endogenous variables y conditionally on the exogenous variables z and
the global mechanism generating (y | z) is "explained" through an ordered
sequence of sub-mechanisms represented by an ordered sequence of condi-
tional univariate distributions.
When the SEM is not recursive, equation (4) does not refer to conditional
distributions, does not stand for conditional expectations (along with errors)
and may be interpreted as referring to "notional" sub-mechanisms in a spirit
similar to that of counterfactuals. For instance, consider a two-equations
elementary market model, generating price and quantity under a competitive
equilibrium. The equation representing the quantity demanded as a function
of the price and other exogenous variables, may be interpreted as the notional
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demand that would operate if the prices were exogenously fixed whereas the
econometric model specifies that the actually observed prices, and quantities,
have been jointly generated under an equilibrium mechanism.
From a causality, or explanation, point of view, equation (5) reflects
a situation of block-recursivity: a global mechanism “explains” that vector
z “causes” vector y but no explanation is given about the functioning of
that mechanism. Only if model (4) were recursive would one obtain an
explanation of the functioning of that global mechanism through a causal
ordering in terms of sub-mechanisms.
3.2 Explanation and structurality
The recursive decomposition provides a structure for the explanation of a
complex system through an ordered sequence of sub-mechanisms that com-
pose the global mechanism. However, conditions (2) and (3) are not sufficient
for ensuring that a given recursive decomposition is the valid one among the
p! possible recursive decompositions (corresponding to the number of ordered
permutations of p variables). We also require conditions for ensuring that
each factor of the product in (2) represents a valid sub-mechanism.
The required conditions are twofold. Firstly, each putative sub-mecha-
nism, represented by a specific conditional distribution, should be congruent
with field knowledge, i.e. with economic theory, as long as this one may be
viewed as an organized synthesis of a large body of out-of-sample observa-
tions relative to the phenomenon of interest.
Secondly, the putative sub-mechanism should be stable, or invariant, rel-
atively to a large class of interventions or of modifications of the environment.
Indeed, a conditional distribution that would be different, say, for each ob-
servation could not be deemed to represent an underlying structure neither
would it be useful, at least for accumulating empirical information. This
refers to the fundamental issue of defining a “population of reference”; in-
deed neither an economic theory nor an econometric model may reasonably
claim to be “universal” in time and in space.
The discussion of models such as (5) often concerns the distinction be-
tween the use of the model to make causal statements or simply use it to
characterize a relationship between the observed data, i.e. a purely descrip-
tive model. If model (5) correctly represents a (block-)causal relationship, it
should be invariant under interventions that change any of the independent
variables z. Conversely if (5) reveals not to be invariant under a wide range
of interventions, it may be appropriate to describe a statistical relationship
supported by the data, but it will not be explanatory. Moreover model (5)
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highlights a possible connection between the invariance on the one hand, and
the relationship between explanation and counterfactual dependence on the
other hand, i.e. dependence with respect to unobserved, or unobservable,
exogenous changes. In other words invariance is a relative concept: a rela-
tionship can be invariant under a set of interventions and not under another
one. Said differently, in the social and behavioral sciences the concept of
invariance can be considered without appealing to a law of nature univer-
sally accepted, a notion that would be difficult to accept in the area of social
sciences.
The stability requirement concerns both the structure of the model, i.e.
the recursive decomposition as a set of sub-mechanisms ( see for instance
Richard (1980) for a change of exogeneity), and the characteristic of the
sub-mechanisms, i.e. the parameters, see for instance Hendry and Mizon
(1982).
When elaborating an economic policy on the basis of an econometric
model, the structural validity of the model is of crucial importance, in par-
ticular because descriptive or non-structural models would provide unreliable
forecasts or policy evaluations. This criticism is known in the literature as
Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976), the essence of which is well summed up in this
sentence: “ ... given that the structure of an econometric model consists of
optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules
vary systematically with changes in the structure of series relevant to the
decision maker, it follows that any change in policy will systematically al-
ter the structure of econometric models ” (Lucas, 1976, p. 41). It is worth
noting that this criticism has strongly encouraged the structural approach
in macroeconometric modeling.
More generally, the issue of invariant parametrization may be particu-
larly complex. Indeed, the characteristics, or parameters, of a conditional
distribution stand for the characteristics of an economically meaningful sub-
mechanism. The tradition in economic theory is to view actual behaviors as
a result of an optimization process. A substantial difficulty may be to decide
what, in that optimization, is actually exogenous, i.e. considered as given.
To take a simple example, when optimizing a consumption plan under a
budget constraint, this assumes that the level of income has been exogenously
fixed, maybe under some equilibrium with respect to leisure and opportu-
nity to increase disposable income (see e.g. Deaton, 1982). Endogenizing
this process substantially increases the complexity of the model and should
therefore be operated only when necessary for a correct specification of the
model. If the endogenization of income is not operated in cases where it
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should have been, the price to be paid is not only a loss of consistency of
the estimator but also a loss of stability of the the underlying parameters
being actually estimated. As a matter of fact, building a model involves not
only an empirical check on the parametric stability, by means for instance
of hypothesis testing, but also a substantial amount of field knowledge that
possibly could point out toward relevant changes of environment.
3.3 Parsimonious modelling
Consider now a conditional distribution, say
pXj |X1,X2,···Xj−1(xj | x1, x2, · · ·xj−1, θj|1,···j−1), (9)
identified as representing a plausible sub-mechanism. As a matter of fact,
field knowledge, or a formal test of hypothesis, often suggests that not all
conditioning variables are actually active in that sub-mechanism. More pre-
cisely, there may be a subset of the conditioning variables, or of functions of
the conditioning variables, say Ij−1, such that:
Xj⊥X1, X2, · · ·Xj−1 | Ij−1 i .e. pXj |X1,X2,···Xj−1 = pXj |Ij−1 . (10)
Ij−1 may be called the information set relevant for the j−th sub-mechanism,
although more formally it is a σ-field rather than a set of variables. Under
these conditions (10), the product, in (2), is condensed into:
pX1,X2,···Xp =
∏
1≤j≤p
pXj |Ij−1 (11)
where I0 stands for an initial condition. Equation (11) may be called a
condensed recursive form and represents the actually relevant structure of
the global mechanism, see also Mouchart and Russo (2011).
3.4 Causal and Structural Models
When all the above conditions are satisfied:
• The conditioning variables entering the information set may be viewed
as exogenous and the conditioned variables may be viewed as endoge-
nous, for that specific sub-mechanism. Thus, a particular variable is
not endogenous or exogenous in itself, but relatively to a particular
sub-mechanism.
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• The conditioning variables may also be viewed as jointly causing the
endogenous variable, viewed as an outcome (or, effect) variable; the
corresponding conditional distribution provides a characterization of
the direct effect of the cause on the outcome.
• The model may accordingly be called structural or causal.
• The global mechanism may be represented graphically by means of
a Directed Acyclic Graph (for short, DAG)( for an introduction to
DAG, see for instance, Pearl, 2009), although the specification of the
information sets and of the condensed recursive form are often out of
the scope of a DAG.
Remark. It is worth mentioning that the concept of exogeneity has a long
history in econometrics. The works of the Cowles Commission in the late
Forties and the early Fifties have been path-breaking and are still influen-
tial nowadays; in particular, Koopmans(1950) puts emphasis on exogeneity
in dynamic models. Later, Barndorff-Nielsen(1978), in a purely statistical
framework, developped general conditions for the separation of inference,
introducing the concept of a cut in a statistical model. Florens, Mouchart
and Rolin (1980) and Florens and Mouchart (1985) bridge Koopmans and
Barndorff-Nielsen works and provide a coherent account of exogeneity in-
tegrating the separation of inference in dynamic and in non-dynamic mod-
els. Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983) present a classification of different
concepts of exogeneity met in the econometric literature and display their
connections with exogeneity through the introduction of supplementary con-
ditions. Florens and Mouchart (1985) not only provide a basic concept of
exogeneity, but also make the concept explicit in different levels of model
specification, namely, global, initial, and sequential, before combining those
concepts of exogeneity with non-causality. This analysis is further developed
in Florens, Mouchart and Rolin (1993).
4 Structural model and parametrization
Let us now consider how to build a structural econometric model, i.e. a
statistical model that would be an appropriate representation of a (global)
economic mechanism in such a way that it would also provide an explana-
tion of the working of that global mechanism. In Section 3, it has been
mentioned that a natural strategy for enhancing the understanding of a
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complex multivariate mechanism would decompose that mechanism into an
ordered sequence of simpler sub-mechanisms: this is the objective of the
recursive decomposition. Therefore a first requirement is that each factor
of the recursive decomposition should provide a suitable representation of a
sub-mechanism stated in the form of a conditional distribution.
From a strictly statistical point of view, model (1) admits any arbitrary
parametrization; in other words a parametrization is just a labeling system
for a set of distributions. From a structural point of view, the parametriza-
tion labels an ordered sequence of conditional distributions, in the form of (2)
or (11), each one representing a structurally relevant sub-mechanism. Thus
a structural parametrization is endowed with an interpretation bound to the
explanation of the global mechanism and of its constituting sub-mechanisms;
it is also endowed with a stability property that ensures the structurality of
the parametrization and allows for the accumulation of statistical informa-
tion.
These ideas may be illustrated by the following simple example. Con-
sider a model representing a market where y stands for the price of a given
commodity and z for the quantity and assume that conditionally on the past
up to time t− 1, namely (Y t−1, Zt−1), the bivariate model is constructed as
follows:
yt ∼ N(µy,t , σ2y,t) (zt | yt) ∼ N(α + βyt , σ2z|y) (12)
This model is equivalent to :(
yt
zt
)
∼ N
[(
µy,t
µz,t
)
,
(
σ2y,t σyz,t
σyz,t σ
2
z,t
)]
(13)
and also equivalent to:
zt ∼ N(µz,t , σ2z,t) (yt | zt) ∼ N(γt + δtzt , σ2y|z,t) (14)
under some obvious relationships among these different parameterizations,
such as:
µz,t = α + βµy,t σyz,t = β σ
2
y,t σ
2
z,t = σ
2
z|y + β
2 σ2y,t (15)
Let us now assume that the model is aimed to represent the working
of a monopolistic market where the offer sets the price y under a possibly
unstable process whereas the demand, generating the quantity z, is just price-
taking under a stable mechanism depending only on the current price. This
economic structure is captured by the model (12) the parameters of which
explain the operation of the global mechanism in terms of two economically
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meaningful sub-mechanisms. Model (13), although statistically equivalent,
does not provide an adequate structure of the global mechanism and its
parametrization has no interpretation in terms of the functioning of the
global mechanism. Model (14) suffers from the same weakness of explanatory
power as model (13): the factors of that underlying recursive decomposition
do not represent the assumed economic structure. Moreover, model (12) has
extracted from the apparent instability of the global process some stable,
and accordingly structural, parameters that will be therefore estimable and
has succeeded in isolating what is not stable. This is a simple example of the
nature of structural modeling: identify relevant sub-mechanisms and identify
the stable aspects of the working of economic mechanisms.
Conversely if it is assumed that price y and quantity z are fixed simul-
taneously following a competitive process aiming at clearing the market,
the economic structures represented by models (12) and (14) are not valid
representations of the economic structure. Only the global mechanism (13)
provides a correct representation of the system without, however, having the
possibility to decompose it into a sequence of simpler sub-mechanisms, i.e.
without providing an explanation of the the equilibrium mechanism. More
explicitly, it might be possible to introduce two notional concepts of offer
and demand but these concepts would not be sufficient for providing an or-
dered causal structure representing the functioning of the global process of
competitive equilibrium.
Remark. The recursive decomposition does not require neither a speci-
fication of the coordinates coding the variables nor a specification of a par-
ticular family of distribution. In other words, the recursive decomposition
is non-parametric and is σ-algebraic in nature. The next step of the mod-
eling is to, simultaneously, specify the coordinates of the variables and a
parametrization of a chosen family of distributions.
5 Pitfalls with alternative parameterizations
Previous sections handle the specification and the parametrization of struc-
tural models. In a purely statistical approach, a parameterization of a statis-
tical model is a labeling system for the distributions the set of which specifies
the model. In a structural econometric model, the parameterization is the
basis for the explanatory mission of the structural model, provided the pa-
rameterization bears on a structurally valid recursive decomposition.
In this section, we treat some difficulties, and possible pitfalls, when
facing alternative possible parameterizations. These issues are indeed im-
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portant for a proper understanding of what is at stake with the choice of the
parameterization. We shall discuss two different questions. The first one is
exemplified with a case of simultaneous equations. Two parameterizations
are used for estimation purposes: the structural form and the reduced form.
Identification restrictions on the structural form ensure the identification of
the parameters characterizing the notional concepts underlying the equations
of the structural form; the proper relationship between the two parameter-
izations has however been the object of repeated misunderstandings in the
econometric literature. A second type of problems is raised when different
structural models are observationally equivalent, i.e. correspond to a same
statistical model, namely a same set of distributions. This is a matter of
model identification, as different from parametric identification.
5.1 Reparameterizations suggesting erroneous constraints
5.1.1 A simple pedagogic example
Consider the following assertion: “In a univariate normal distribution, N(µ, σ2),
if the variance σ2 tends to zero, the expectation µ necessarily tends to zero”.
As a “ proof”, of this assertion, consider the inverse of the coefficient of
variation η = µσ−1; thus µ = ησ and therefore σ → 0 implies µ→ 0.
Such an assertion and its “proof” rest on a fallacious argument. The error
may be viewed as follows: the pair θ = (µ, σ) ∈ Θ gives one parametriza-
tion of the univariate normal family while λ = (η, σ) ∈ Λ gives another one;
both parameterizations (of the same family of distributions) have the same
parameter space Θ = Λ = R×R+ without restrictions on the range of vari-
ation of the parameters. The argument “σ → 0 implies µ → 0” is therefore
invalid because it is based on a relationship (µ = ησ) involving two differ-
ent parameterizations: (µ, σ) and (η, σ). The fallaciousness of the assertion
above may be viewed graphically in Figure 1 as follows. Let us consider a
fixed value e0 of η and the corresponding subsets of the two parametrizations
T0 = {(µ, σ) ∈ Θ|µ = σ e0} and L0 = {(η, σ) ∈ Λ|η = e0}. Clearly L0 and
T0 correspond to each other: they represent the same set of normal distri-
butions. To a converging sequence σ → 0 corresponds, in L0, a sequence
converging to (e0, 0) and, in T0, a sequence converging to (0, 0). This trivial
fact does not imply any relationship between µ and σ in Θ, i.e. Θ has a
product structure, equivalently µ and σ are variation-free.
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Figure 1: A same converging sequence in two parameterizations.
5.1.2 A case in simultaneous equations
As naive as it may seem, the previous fallacious argument has been met
in less elementary situations, when considering different parameterizations
of a given model. As an example, let us consider the simplest version of
Haavelmo (1947)’s model:
ct = δ0 + δyt + ut with ut ∼ IN(0, σuu)
yt = ct + zt ut⊥ zt
(16)
with reduced form:
yt = α0 + αzt + vt (17)
where α0 = δ0(1 − δ)−1, α = (1 − δ)−1, vt = (1 − δ)−1ut. Let us also
assume that zt ∼ IN(µz, σzz) independently of ut (or of vt). The reduced
form implies σyy = α2σzz + σvv and therefore α2 < σyyσ−1zz . This (true)
inequality appears to have been erroneously interpreted as a constraint on
the parameter space. For instance, Genberg (1972) suggests to estimate α
under the restriction α2 < q, where q would be a consistent estimator of the
variance ratio σyyσ−1zz and notices that if one were to use a ratio of sample
moments to estimate σyyσ−1zz the restriction α2 < q would not be binding
when estimating α by ordinary least squares. Remark that Gensberg’s pro-
posal could also be used to assert that Haavelmo’s model implies a (wrong)
restriction over σzz, namely σzz < σyyα−2.
As a matter of fact, we have two parameterizations (structural form and
reduced form) of a same model, namely (µz, σzz, δ0, δ, σuu) = θ, say and
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(µz, σzz, α0, α, σvv) = λ, say. These parameterizations are in bijection and
each is variation-free: there is no constraint among the parameters within
a same parameterization. The variance of y, σyy, is a function of these
parameters, indifferently of θ or of λ, is not a new parameter and introduces
no new constraint neither on θ nor on λ. In particular, the (true) inequality
σyy > α
2σzz does not introduce a constraint within the parametrization θ1.
In order to ascertain how fallacious these arguments of “constraints often
overlooked” (see Zellner, 1972 and Maddala, 1976) are, we consider, in rather
obvious notation, two equivalent parameterizations of the set of bivariate
normal distributions on (y, z):
θ∗ = (µy, µz, σyy, σyz, σzz) ∈ Θ∗ = IR2 × C(2) (18)
λ∗ = (µz, α0, α, σvv, σzz) ∈ Λ∗ = IR3 × IR2+ (19)
where α0 = µy−αµz, α = σyzσ−1zz , σvv = σyy−σ2yzσ−1zz and C(2) is the cone
of the (2 × 2) SPDS matrices. It should be pointed out that there is no
restriction on the range of α, neither on that of σzz nor on that of σyy. As in
the pedagogic example, inequalities like α2 < σyyσ−1zz involve two different
parametrizations and represent no restriction on any parameter space.
Before qualifying the use of such inequalities as misleading restrictions,
it may be illustrative to consider a slightly more general version of the very
same example. Let us consider the model:
(y|z) ∼ Nm(Π′az,Σvv)
z ∼ Nk(0,Σzz)
(20)
where Πα is a (k ×m) matrix the elements of which are known functions of
a vector of unknown parameters α. This model may also be written as:(
y
z
)
∼ Nm+k
[(
0
0
)
,
(
Σyy Π
′
αΣzz
ΣzzΠα, Σzz
)]
(21)
where Σyy = Σvv+Π′αΣzzΠα. Thus we consider two equivalent parametriza-
tions:
θ∗∗ = (Σzz,Σvv, α) ∈ Θ∗∗ = C(k) × C(m) ×A (22)
λ∗∗ = (Σzz,Σyy, α) ∈ Λ∗∗ = {(Σzz,Σyy, α) ∈ C(k) × C(m) ×A
|Σyy −Π′αΣzzΠα ∈ C(m)} (23)
1But if the estimation of σyy introduces new data, then we have a case of mixed
estimation, “à-la-Theil”, or of mixed Bayesian estimation and the constraints may have
a role in the procedure of blending two sources of data but not for introducing new
constraints on the parameter space.
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where A is the set of possible values for α, the “free” parameters of the
(possibly overidentified) reduced form. Here it is valid to recognize that the
parameter space Λ∗∗ is restricted by the condition: Σyy −Π′αΣzzΠα ∈ C(m),
i.e. Σyy −Π′αΣzzΠα(= Σvv) should be SPDS, and thus Σyy,Σzz, α are not
variation free . Note however that the relationship Σyy−Σvv ∈ C(m), although
true, does not provide any effective restriction as it grounds on two different
parametrizations. The danger of overlooking this fact can be illustrated in
the particular case where m = 2, α = (β, γ),Πα = (βγ, β) = β(γ, 1) with
β ∈ IRk and γ ∈ IR. Thus, in this particular case:
Σyy = Σvv + β
′Σzzβ
(
γ2 γ
γ 1
)
Here it is valid that, in Λ∗∗, parameters α,Σzz and Σyy should be restricted
by:
Σyy − β′Σzzβ
(
γ2 γ
γ 1
)
∈ C(2)
or, more explicitly:
σy1y1 ≥ γ2β′Σzzβ
σy2y2 ≥ β′Σzzβ
σy1y1σy2y2 − σ2y1y2 ≥ β′Σzzβ(γ2 σy2y2 − 2γ σy1y2 + σy1y1)
(Note that one of the first two inequalities is redundant). A fallacious use of
the (true) relationship β′Σzzβ = γ−1(σy1y2 − σv1v2) would be to assert that,
from the above inequalities, γ is constrained to satisfy restrictions such as
the following ones:
σy1y2 − σv1v2
σy2y2
≶ γ ≶ σy1y1
σy1y2 − σv1v2
according to : σy1y2 ≶ σv1v2 (24)
γ2 σy2y2(σy1y2 − σv1v2) − γ[σy1y1σy2y2 − σ2y1y2 + 2σy1y2(σy1y2 − σv1v2)]
+σy1y1(σy1y2 − σv1v2) ≤ 0 (25)
In other words, we disagree with the contention that (24) or (25) would
mean that “certain parameter values are subject to bounds flowing from usual
specifying assumptions”. Indeed inequalities (24) and (25) do not represent
restrictions neither on Θ∗∗ nor on Λ∗∗: they only express some properties
of the correspondence between Θ∗∗ and Λ∗∗. As a consequence, estimating
γ, for instance, under the restriction implied by consistent estimates of the
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bounds of inequalities (24) would either be ineffective, if a correct param-
eterization is employed, or would consist of using twice the same sample
information if one were to step from one parameterization to another one.
This later would be the case when estimating e.g. bounds in one parame-
terization before estimating the other parameterization without taking due
account of the double use of the same sample information.
When pooling two sources of information as is done with bayesian meth-
ods or in pooling time series and cross-section data or in mixed estimation,
the use of two parameterizations may be justifiable. In the above example,
while θ∗∗ may be the most natural parameterization for the final inference,
it may be that there is available some prior information on, say, Σyy leading
to consider also the λ∗∗-parameterization as a natural recipient for that prior
information. If inference only concerns parameters common to θ∗∗ and λ∗∗,
i.e. α and/or Σzz, one may also start by first incorporating the prior informa-
tion in the λ∗∗-parameterization and thereafter reparameterize in θ∗∗ before
incorporating the second information. Such a stepwise procedure seems to
be the only available one in the case of inference on Σvv. It should neverthe-
less be noticed that even in such a case inequalities (24) or (25) will never
appear as restriction on any parameter space.
The reader may like to compare this analysis with the debate between
Maddala (1976, a and 1976,b) and Zellner (1972, 1976, a and 1976,b) that
has been inconclusive for missing the issue of the relationships between al-
ternative parameterizations.
5.2 Reparameterizations involving different but observation-
ally equivalent sub-mechanisms
The previous section illustrates possible abuse of restrictions due to a falla-
cious argument involving alternative parameterizations. In this section, we
consider two different structural models that are nevertheless observationally
equivalent and, therefore, correspond to two different parameterizations of
a same model. In such cases the two parameterizations correspond to two
different (sub-)mechanisms possibly suggesting different contextually rele-
vant parametric restrictions. As a matter of fact the price equations of the
two models below represent two structurally different mechanisms, and the
corresponding parameters capture quite a different economic meaning.
“Model 1” (from Bowden, 1978 b )
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Consider a simple price adjustment model:
Dt = α
′
1x
D
t − α2Pt + u1t (26)
St = β
′
1x
S
t + β2Pt + u2t (27)
Pt = µPt−1 + (1− µ)P ∗t + u3t (28)
where Dt (demand), St (supply) and Pt (price) are endogenous variables, xDt
and xSt are exogenous variables and P ∗t is a “clearing” price defined as:
P ∗t = (β2 + α2)
−1(α′1x
D
t − β′1xSt + u1t − u2t) (29)
Therefore, the reduced form of the price equation is:
Pt = µPt−1 + (1− µ)[(β2 + α2)−1(α′1xDt − β′1xSt + u1t − u2t)] + u3t
= µPt−1 + (1− µ)(β2 + α2)−1α′1xDt − (1− µ)(β2 + α2)−1β′1xSt
+(1− µ)(β2 + α2)−1[u1t − u2t)] + u3t (30)
“Model 2” (from Fair and Jaffee, 1972)
Consider another model given by equations (26), (27) and the alternative
specification of the price adjustment mechanism
Pt − Pt−1 = η(Dt − St) + u∗∗3t (31)
equivalently:
Pt = Pt−1 + η(Dt − St) + u∗∗3t (32)
= Pt−1 + η[α′1x
D
t − α2Pt + u1t − (β′1xSt + β2Pt + u2t)] + u∗∗3t
= [1 + η(β2 + α2)]
−1[Pt−1 + ηα′1x
D
t − ηβ′1xSt + η(u1t − u2t) + u∗∗3t ]
Therefore, the reduced form of the price equation is:
Pt = [1 + η(β2 + α2)]
−1Pt−1 + [1 + η(β2 + α2)]−1ηα′1x
D
t
−[1 + η(β2 + α2)]−1ηβ′1xSt
+[1 + η(β2 + α2)]
−1[η(u1t − u2t) + u∗∗3t ] (33)
Notice that (28) has sense only if 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 whereas in (31) one should
require η ∈ IR+. Therefore the parameter spaces corresponding to Models 1
and 2 are:
θ = (α1, β1, α2, β2, µ,Σ) ∈ Θ = IRkD+kS × IR2+ × [0, 1]× C(3) (34)
λ = (α1, β1, α2, β2, η,Σ
∗∗) ∈ Λ = IRkD+kS × IR3+ × C(3) (35)
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where kD is the number of variables in xD, kS is the number of variables in
xS (for the sake of presentation, we assume no common exogenous variable
in xS and xD), Σ = V ar(u1, u2, u3) and Σ∗∗ = V ar(u1, u2, u∗∗3 ).
The two price equations (28), along with (30) and (31) with (33), repre-
sent two different sub-mechanisms. Model 1 and Model 2 are nevertheless
observationally equivalent because they provide two different parameteriza-
tions of a same set of distributions. Indeed, from the coefficients of Pt−1 the
mapping between θ and λ is given by:
µ = [1 + η(β2 + α2)]
−1 η =
1− µ
µ(β2 + α2)
(36)
implying that in equations (34) and (35) we indeed have:
µ ∈ [0, 1] corresponding to η ∈ IR+
Moreover, for the coefficients of (u1t − u2t), we may check that:
(1− µ)(β2 + α2)−1 = [1 + η(β2 + α2)]−1η
and conclude that the two models are observationally equivalent under the
identification relationship:
u3t = [1 + η(β2 + α2)]
−1u∗∗3t u
∗∗
3t = µ
−1u3t (37)
As a matter of fact, equation ( 37) may be viewed as a short-hand notation
for:
σj3 = [1 + η(β2 + α2)]
−1σ∗∗j3 σ
∗∗
j3 = µ
−1σj3 j = 1, 2 (38)
σ33 = [1 + η(β2 + α2)]
−2σ∗∗33 σ
∗∗
33 = µ
−2σ33 (39)
Note that µ and Σ are variation free in Θ; so are also η and Σ∗∗ in Λ. It
may be nevertheless tempting to erroneously conclude from (37) , as in the
previous section, that “ µ→ 0 implies σ33 → 0 because u3t = µu∗∗3t ”.
Once Model 1 and Model 2 are recognized as observationally equivalent,
does it imply that the two price sub-mechanisms are also equivalent? The
answer is: no! Indeed, equations (28) and (31) explain the disequilibrium
of the market by two different price sub-mechanisms : in equation (28) the
price sub-mechanism partially adjusts the past price to the current equilib-
rium price whereas equation (31) partially adjusts the past price in function
of the disequilibrium in quantity. Thus the parameters µ and η have a clearly
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different economic meaning. In other words, the choice between the specifi-
cations of Models 1 and 2 is a choice between two different parameterizations
of a same (conditional) distribution and should be based on economic and
contextual plausibility and on structural stability.
This example illustrates several issues. Firstly, the two models are obser-
vationally equivalent: no data may decide in favor of one against the other
one. Nevertheless, the two price equations represent two structurally dif-
ferent sub-mechanisms, the corresponding parameters being endowed with
quite a different economic meaning: only field knowledge, structural sta-
bility (or invariance) or new information may decide which one is actually
structural. Secondly, again, one should operate a clear distinction between
relationships among alternative parameterizations, bringing no restrictions
on the parameter space, and genuine restrictions that might be used either to
improve inference, if accepted, or to be subjected to testing, if put in doubt.
Thirdly, alternative parameterizations may possibly bring interesting infor-
mation in an encompassing spirit. For instance, if one is willing to interpret
the parameters of Model 1 at the light of Model 2, the relationship (36)
would tell that a value of µ close to 0 (resp. 1) in Model 1 would correspond
to a great (resp. small) value of η in model 2. But this relationship implies
no restriction neither on µ nor on η.
More recently, An and Schorfheide (2007) produced another example of
two observationally equivalent models corresponding to two different parame-
trizations of a same family of conditional distributions. These two models
describe different sub-mechanisms characterized by parameters with a dif-
ferent economic interpretation. Through an implied identification problem,
they propose to work out a bayesian solution. This example shows that when
specifying a structural model it is not sufficient to specify a family of dis-
tributions: a particular parametrization, with a specific economic meaning,
should also be specified.
6 Concluding remarks
6.1 Summarizing: The basic framework
In this paper, we make explicit the link between causal model and structural
model. In particular, the structural explanation of a model is based on a
recursive decomposition of the model itself, together with the interpretation
of each term of the structural decomposition as an economic sub-mechanism.
When we can reach this structuring of the model, the explanatory variables
can be interpreted as causal variables.
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We also propose an approach for building a structural econometric model,
i.e. a statistical model that provides (i) an appropriate representation of a
global economic mechanism and (ii) an explanation of the working of that
global mechanism i.e. each factor of the recursive decomposition should pro-
vide a suitable representation of an economically meaningful sub-mechanism.
The necessary conditions for a recursive decomposition to be interpreted
as a structural model, are: (i) there is congruence with the underlying eco-
nomic theory (ii) there is invariance or stability of the parameters character-
izing the economic sub-mechanisms as well as of the recursive decomposition
itself.
One limitation of this approach is that the explanatory power of the
model relies on its recursive decomposition. A completely recursive de-
composition provides a complete causal ordering of the variables. When
a completely recursive decomposition is not possible, i.e. the case of block-
recursivity where the recursive decomposition is only partial, there is a si-
multaneity of the action of several sub-mechanisms within the generation
of a block of endogenous variables. In this case, the model cannot claim
for causal effects within the block of endogenous variables because outcomes
cannot cause each other simultaneously.
From a narrow statistical point of view, the parametrization of a family of
distributions is arbitrary. In a structural modeling approach the issue is more
subtle. Indeed, a basic requirement of structurality is the stability of the
recursive decomposition, involving both the stability of the decomposition
itself and the stability of the parameters of the different distributions. As
a matter of fact, the stability of these characteristics is, in general, not
complete. As mentioned in an example of Section 4, some factors of the
decomposition may be more stable than others. Therefore the specification
of the parametrization should be based on the search of the parameters that
are likely to be more stable; this ensures that these parameters are endowed
with a reliable economic meaning.
This paper also makes explicit some difficulties and pitfalls when han-
dling alternative parameterizations, namely the danger of introducing illegit-
imate constraints in case of alternative parameterizations of a same model,
or selecting among two different sub-mechanisms leading to observationally
equivalent models.
6.2 On the use of models for the design of economic policy
An intervention, such as an economic policy, should be based on a struc-
tural, or causal, model rather than on a descriptive model. More specifically,
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econometric models used for the design of economic policy should represent
actual behavior, be it macro- or micro-, rather than provide a representation
based on theoretically grounded behavior. This is precisely the meaning of
an econometric structural, or causal, model.
Thus the model builder should carefully check the structural stability of
the model, in particular its resilience to a suitable class of transformations of
the environment. Indeed the parameters and the recursive structure of the
model should not be thought in a universal sense, in space and in time, and
it is crucial to evaluate how the “universe” should be circumscribed. Lucas’
critique may indeed be interpreted as referring to the fact that an inter-
vention may modify the structure of the causal model, because a model is
developed within a given environment and the difficulty may be to evaluate
to what extent a modification of the environment might modify some prop-
erties of the causal model. Thus the strategy for building an econometric
model should identify from the apparent instability of the global process the
relevant sub-mechanisms and identify the stable aspects of the working of
economic mechanisms.
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